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Abstract
By introducing a semi-honest third party (TP), we propose in this paper a novel QPC protocol using (n + 1)-
qubit (n ≥ 2) Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states as information carriers. The parameter n not only
determines the number of qubits contained in a GHZ state, but also determines the probability that TP can suc-
cessfully steal the participants’ data and the qubit efficiency. In the proposed protocol, we do not employ any
other quantum technologies (e.g., entanglement swapping and unitary operation) except necessary technologies
such as preparing quantum states and quantum measurements, which can reduce the need for quantum devices.
We use the keys generated by quantum key distribution and bit-flipping for privacy protection, and decoy photons
for eavesdropping checking, making both external and internal attacks invalid. Specifically, for external attacks,
we take several well-known attack means (e.g., the intercept-resend attack and the measurement-resend attack) as
examples to show that the attackers outside the protocol can not steal the participants’ data successfully, in which
we provide the security proof of the protocol against the entanglement-measurement attack. For internal attacks,
we show that TP cannot steal the participants’ data and the participants cannot steal each other’s data. We also
show that the existing attack means against QPC protocols are invalid for our protocol.
PACS: 03.67.Dd; 03.67.Hk; 03.67.Pp
Keywords: information security, quantum cryptography, quantum private comparison
1 Introduction
Comparing two or more data to determine whether they are the same has a wide range of applications in
information science, such as malware detection and clustering, patch generation and analysis, and bug search
[1, 2]. A natural question is how to complete the comparison if all the data are confidential. This problem is called
“Tierce´ problem” or “socialist millionaires’ problem”, which is originated from the “millionaires’ problem” raised
by Yao in 1982 [3–6]. The solutions to this problem can also solve many problems in real life, such as secret
bidding and auctions, secret ballot elections, e-commerce, data mining, and authentication [3–6].
Quantum private comparison (QPC), as an important branch of quantum secure multi-party computation (QSMC)
[3, 7], is the generalization of the solutions to the “Tierce´ problem” in quantum mechanics. The difference be-
tween QPC and the classical solutions is that its security is based on the principles of quantum mechanics rather
than computational complexity [3–9]. QPC has attracted wide attention from academia in recent decade because
it can provide unconditional security for real-life information transactions. A QPC protocol needs to introduce a
semi-honest third party (conventionally called TP), who faithfully executes protocol processes to assist participants
in completing private comparison and will not collude with any participant, but he cannot steal the participants’
data in all possible ways [3, 6]. In addition, a QPC protocol should satisfy two conditions [3, 6]: 1) fairness: all
participants get the comparison result at the same time without a specific order; 2) security: each participant’s data
is confidential, and the other participants, TP and the attackers outside the protocol cannot successfully steal the
participant’s data; iff all participants’ data are the same, the participants know each other’s secret data.
In this paper, we propose a novel QPC protocol. We use Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states as infor-
mation carriers, and introduce a semi-honest TP who assists the participants in completing the protocol without
colluding with them. Unlike most existing protocols, our protocol only uses single-particle measurement tech-
nology instead of entanglement measurement, entanglement swapping, unitary operation and other technologies,
∗Project supported by the State Key Program of National Natural Science of China (Grant No. 61332019), the Major State Basic Research
Development Program of China (973 Program, Grant No. 2014CB340601), the National Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61202386
and No. 61402339), and the National Cryptography Development Fund (No. MMJJ201701304).
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which naturally reduces the need for expensive quantum devices. As for the security of the protocol, we make
use of the entanglement correlation of the GHZ states, and use the techniques of quantum key distribution (QKD)
[10–15], decoy photons and bit-flipping to protect data privacy. In addition, the GHZ states are prepared by partic-
ipants rather than by TP, which can to some extent improve the security and efficiency of the protocol. We prove in
detail that our protocol can resist both external and internal attacks. In particular, we give the security proof against
the entanglement-measurement attack, which may be of guiding significance to the design and security analysis of
other QSMC protocols.
We arrange the rest of this paper as follows. In Sec. 2, we first introduce the GHZ states used in our protocol,
and then describe protocol steps in detail. Sec. 3 is devoted to analyze the protocol security, including the outsider
attack and insider attack. Sec. 4 gives some useful discussions. We make a summary in Sec. 5.
2 Proposed quantum private comparison protocol
Let us now introduce the GHZ states. The canonical orthonormal m-qubit (m ∈ N+ and m ≥ 3) GHZ states, as
information carriers in our protocol, can be expressed as∣∣∣G±k 〉 = 1√
2
( ∣∣∣B(k)〉 ± ∣∣∣B(2m − k − 1)〉 ), (1)
where k = 0, 1, . . . , 2m−1 − 1, and B(k) = 0b2b3 · · · bm is the binary representation of k in an m-bit string, thus
k = 0 · 2m−1 + b2 · 2m−2 + b3 · 2m−3 + · · · + bm · 20. Obviously, they are orthonormal and and complete,
〈G±k |G±k′〉 = δk,k′ . (2)
Eq. 1 can be written in a more concise form as follows:∣∣∣G±k 〉 = 1√
2
(
|0b2b3 · · · bm〉 ±
∣∣∣1b¯2b¯3 · · · b¯m〉 ), (3)
where a bar over a bit value indicates its logical negation.
2.1 Prerequisites
Next, let us introduce three prerequisites for the proposed protocol.
1. Suppose that two participants, Alice and Bob, have secret data X and Y respectively; the binary repre-
sentations of X are (x1, x2, . . . , xN), and Y (y1, y2, . . . , yN), where x j, y j ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j = 1, 2, . . . ,N, X =∑N
j=1 x j2
j−1,Y =
∑N
j=1 y j2
j−1 (N ∈ N+, and N is usually a large number, just like the value of the mil-
lionaire’s wealth mentioned in the Introduction). With the help of the semi-honest third party (TP) who may
behave badly but will not collude with either participant, Alice and Bob want to judge whether X = Y .
2. Alice(Bob) divides the binary representation of X(Y) into dN/ne groups,
G1a,G
2
a, . . . ,G
d Nn e
a (G1b,G
2
b, . . . ,G
d Nn e
b ), (4)
where n ∈ N+ and 2 ≤ n ≤ N throughout this protocol, and each group Gia(Gib) includes n bits (i =
1, 2, . . . , dN/ne throughout this protocol). If N mod n = l, Alice(Bob) adds l 0 into the last group GdN/nea
(GdN/neb ).
3. Alice, Bob and TP agree on the following coding rules: |0〉 ↔ 0 and |1〉 ↔ 1; the coding rules are public.
2.2 Protocol steps
Let us now describe in detail the steps of the protocol: (the flow chart of the protocol is shown in fig. 1):
1. Step 1: key generation
Alice and Bob use QKD to generate the shared secret key sequence {K1AB,K2AB, . . . ,KdN/neAB } (note that if Alice
and Bob are in the same place, they can directly generate the shared key sequence without using QKD).
Similarly, Alice and TP generate the shared key sequence {K1AC , K2AC ,. . ., KdN/neAC }. Bob and TP generate the
shared key sequence {K1BC , K2BC ,. . ., KdN/neBC }. Here, KiAB,KiAC ,KiBC ∈ {0, 1}, and note that the keys generated
by QKD are confidential and are always assumed to be secure in QPC. Otherwise, the security of the protocol
can not be guaranteed and the design of the protocol can not be completed.
2
2. Step 2: encryption
Alice(Bob) computes KiAB ⊕ KiAC(KiAB ⊕ KiBC) and denotes the computing results as RiA(RiB) (i.e. RiA =
KiAB ⊕ KiBC ,RiB = KiAB ⊕ KiBC), where the symbol ⊕ denotes the module 2 operation (i.e. XOR operator)
throughout this paper. Then, Alice(Bob) encrypts her(his) data Gia(G
i
b) according to the value of R
i
A(R
i
B).
Concretely, if RiA = 1(R
i
B = 1), she(he) flips each bit in G
i
a(G
i
b) (e.g. 0101→ 1010), otherwise keeps Gia(Gib)
unchanged. Finally, Alice(Bob) denotes her(his) encrypted data as Gi
′
a (G
i′
b ), that is,
Gi
′
a (G
i′
b ) =
Gia(Gib), if RiA = 0(RiB = 0);∼Gia(∼Gib), if RiA = 1(RiB = 1), (5)
where the symbol ∼ is a bitwise inverse operator. For example, if Gia = 01101, then ∼Gia = 10010.
3. Step 3: state preparation
According to the value of Gi
′
a (G
i′
b ), Alice(Bob) prepares the (n + 1)-qubit GHZ state∣∣∣G(a0i , a1i , . . . , ani )〉 = 1√
2
( |0a1a2 · · · an〉 + |1a¯1a¯2 · · · a¯n〉 )( ∣∣∣G(b0i , b1i , . . . , bni )〉 = 1√
2
( |0b1b2 · · · bn〉 + ∣∣∣1b¯1b¯2 · · · b¯n〉 )), (6)
where a1a2 · · · an(b1b2 · · · bn) is the binary representation of Gi′a (Gi′b ), hence
Gi
′
a = a1 · 2n−1 + a2 · 2n−2 + · · · + an · 20(
Gi
′
b = b1 · 2n−1 + b2 · 2n−2 + · · · + bn · 20
)
. (7)
Subsequently, Alice(Bob) takes all the particles out from
∣∣∣G(a0i , a1i , . . . , ani )〉(∣∣∣G(b0i , b1i , . . . , bni )〉) to construct
the sequence
a01, a
1
1, . . . , a
n
1, a
0
2, a
1
2, . . . , a
n
2, . . . , a
0
dN/ne, a
1
dN/ne, . . . , a
n
dN/ne(
b01, b
1
1, . . . , b
n
1, b
0
2, b
1
2, . . . , b
n
2, . . . , b
0
dN/ne, b
1
dN/ne, . . . , b
n
dN/ne
)
, (8)
and denotes it as S a(S b).
4. Step 4: transmission
Alice(Bob) prepares a set of decoy photons, where each decoy photon is randomly chosen from the four
states |0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉 (|±〉 = 1/√2 (|0〉 ± |1〉)). Subsequently, Alice(Bob) inserts each decoy photon into
S a(S b) at a random position; the new generated sequence is denoted as S ∗a(S ∗b). Finally, Alice(Bob) sends
S ∗a(S ∗b) to TP.
5. Step 5: eavesdropping checking
After confirming TP’s receipt of S ∗a(S ∗b), Alice(Bob) tells TP the positions and bases of the decoy photons.
TP then measures the decoy photons with the bases announced, and tells Alice(Bob) the measurement out-
comes. Based on the comparison between the initial states and the measurement outcomes of the decoy
photons, they can judge whether there is eavesdropping in the quantum channels. The error rate exceeding
the predetermined threshold will lead to the termination and restart of the protocol, otherwise the protocol
will proceed to the next step.
6. Step 6: measurement and comparison
TP performs single-particle measurements on each particle in S a and S b with Z basis {|0〉 , |1〉}. That is, TP
measures each particle marked by a0i , a
1
i , ..., a
n
i (b
0
i , b
1
i , ..., b
n
i ) in S a(S b). Then, according to the coding rules
(see the third prerequisite of our protocol), TP denotes the binary numbers corresponding to the measurement
result of the first particle marked by a0i (b
0
i ) as M
1
Ai
(M1Bi ), and denotes the binary numbers corresponding to
the measurement result of the remaining particles marked by a1i , ..., a
n
i (b
1
i , ..., b
n
i ) as M
2
Ai
(M2Bi ).
TP computes M1Ai ⊕ KiAC(M1Bi ⊕ KiBC), and denotes the computing results as CiA(CiB). Then, according to the
value of CiA(C
i
B), TP performs the following operations on M
2
Ai
(M2Bi ): If C
i
A = 1(C
i
B = 1), TP flips each bit
in M2Ai (M
2
Bi
), otherwise keeps M2Ai (M
2
Bi
) unchanged. Denotes the value of M2Ai (M
2
Bi
) after the operations as
M2
′
Ai
(M2
′
Bi
), then
M2
′
Ai (M
2′
Bi ) =
M2Ai (M2Bi ), if CiA = 0(CiB = 0);∼M2Ai (∼M2Bi ), if CiA = 1(CiB = 1). (9)
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TP computes M2
′
Ai
⊕ M2′Bi and denote the computing results as RiC . If RiC = 00 · · · 0 (i.e., the results are all
0), TP can conclude that X = Y , otherwise X , Y . Finally, TP publicly announces the comparison result to
Alice and Bob.
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Figure 1: The flow chart of the protocol. The solid arrow lines represent quantum channels, and the dashed arrow
lines classical channels. For simplicity, we intentionally omit external eavesdroppers and eavesdropping checking
steps.
2.3 Output correctness
Let us show that the output of our protocol is correct. That is, we will show that the value of M2
′
Ai
⊕ M2′Bi
equals Gia ⊕ Gib. For clarity, we list all possible intermediate computational results in Table 1. As can be seen
from the table, M2
′
Ai
⊕ M2′Bi is always equal to Gia ⊕Gib or ∼Gia ⊕ ∼Gib. Next let us prove that the equation Gia ⊕Gib
= ∼Gia ⊕ ∼Gib always holds. Indeed, we only need to prove that two bits satisfies the equation because XOR is a
bitwise operator. Suppose there are two bits p and q, where p, q ∈ {0, 1}. Due to p ⊕ q = (¬p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ ¬q),
¬p ⊕ ¬q = (¬(¬p) ∧ ¬q) ∨ (¬p ∧ ¬(¬q)) = (p ∧ ¬q) ∨ (¬p ∧ q) = p ⊕ q. Therefore, Gia ⊕Gib = ∼Gia ⊕ ∼Gib.
3 Security analysis
Let us now analyze the security of the proposed protocol. We would first like to show the attacks from the
eavesdroppers outside the protocol (i.e., the external attack) are invalid. We then show that the internal attacks,
including those by participants and TP, are also invalid.
3.1 External attack
Generally, the external attack refers to the attempt by someone outside the protocol to steal the participants’
secret data from a quantum channel. In our protocol, we use the keys generated by QKD and bit-flipping to encrypt
the participants’ data, and decoy photon technology to check the security of the quantum channels. It is known
that the decoy photon technology is derived from QKD, and has been proved unconditionally safe [11]. With this
technology, Eve will be caught no matter what kind of attack means he uses, such as the intercept-resend attack,
the measurement-resend attack, the entanglement-measurement attack and the denial-of-service attack [6, 16, 17].
In what follows, we would like to analyze the security of our protocol against the well-known attacks including
the intercept-resend attack, the measurement-resend attack and the entanglement-measurement attack. we will first
analyze the security of the protocol under the first two attacks, and then provide the security proof against the last
one.
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Table 1: The truth table
KiAB K
i
AC K
i
BC M
1
Ai
M1Bi R
i
A R
i
B C
i
A C
i
B M
2′
Ai
M2
′
Bi
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Gia G
i
b
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Gia G
i
b
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 Gia G
i
b
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 Gia G
i
b
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 Gia G
i
b
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 Gia G
i
b
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 Gia G
i
b
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 Gia G
i
b
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 Gia G
i
b
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 Gia G
i
b
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 Gia G
i
b
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 Gia G
i
b
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 Gia G
i
b
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 Gia G
i
b
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 Gia G
i
b
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 Gia G
i
b
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 ∼Gia ∼Gib
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 ∼Gia ∼Gib
3.1.1 Security against the intercept-resend attack and the measurement-resend attack
The intercept-resend attack can be described as follows: An eavesdropper (conventionally called Eve) inter-
cepts all the particles sent from TP to the participants in Step 4, and replaces these particles with fake ones. Then
Eve performs single particle measurements on each particle in the (n + 1)-qubit GHZ states after the participants
tells TP the positions and bases of decoy photons. However, he cannot steal the participant’s data because the data
is encrypted by bit-flipping and the keys generated by QKD, and he will be detected by the participants with the
probability of 1−(3/4)l when l decoy photons are used for eavesdropping checking in Step 5, where the probability
will get closer and closer to 1 with the increase in l.
The measurement-resend attack refers to Eve measures directly all the particles after intercepting them, in
which case he will be easily detected by the participants in eavesdropping checking, and he cannot obtain any
useful information because he cannot distinguish the decoy photons from the particles in (n+ 1)-qubit GHZ states.
3.1.2 Security against the entanglement-measurement attack
The entanglement-measurement attack can be described as follows: Eve intercepts part or all of the particles
transmitted between Alice(Bob) and TP in Step 4, and entangles them with the ancillary particles that she prepares
beforehand, and then resends them to TP. Finally, Eve performs measurements on the ancillary particles to extract
the information carried by them.
Let us now analyze the case that Eve intercepts the particles sent from Alice to TP (as for the interception of the
particles sent from Bob to TP, analysis can be carried out in the same way). Let us denote Eve’s unitary operator
5
as U, without loss of generality, Eve’s entanglement action can be expressed as
U |0〉 |ε〉 = λ00 |0〉 |00〉 + λ01 |1〉 |01〉 ,U |1〉 |ε〉 = λ10 |0〉 |10〉 + λ11 |1〉 |11〉 , (10)
where |00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉 are the pure states determined only by U, |ε〉 is an ancillary particle, and ||λ00||2 +
||λ01||2 = 1, ||λ10||2 + ||λ11||2 = 1.
When U is performed on the decoy states |+〉 and |−〉, one can get
U |+〉 |ε〉 = 1√
2
(λ00 |0〉 |00〉 + λ01 |1〉 |01〉 + λ10 |0〉 |10〉 + λ11 |1〉 |11〉)
=
1
2
|+〉 (λ00 |00〉 + λ01 |01〉 + λ10 |10〉 + λ11 |11〉)
+
1
2
|−〉 (λ00 |00〉 − λ01 |01〉 + λ10 |10〉 − λ11 |11〉), (11)
and
U |−〉 |ε〉 = 1√
2
(λ00 |0〉 |00〉 + λ01 |1〉 |01〉 − λ10 |0〉 |10〉 − λ11 |1〉 |11〉)
=
1
2
|+〉 (λ00 |00〉 + λ01 |01〉 − λ10 |10〉 − λ11 |11〉)
+
1
2
|−〉 (λ00 |00〉 − λ01 |01〉 − λ10 |10〉 + λ11 |11〉). (12)
From Eqs. 10, 11, and 12, if Eve wants to avoid introducing errors in the eavesdropping checking step, U must
meet the following conditions:
λ01 = λ10 = 0, λ00 |00〉 = λ11 |11〉 . (13)
Next, let us demonstrate that entanglement-measurement attack is invalid to our protocol. Concretely, Eve en-
tangles the (n+1)-qubit GHZ state
∣∣∣G(a0i , a1i , . . . , ani )〉 prepared by Alice with ancillary particles, and then measures
the ancillary particles to extract information. This is how Eve attempts to steal Alice’s data, which will be proved
invalid below.
From Eqs. 10, 11, 12, and 13, if U acts on the single particle state |a〉 where a ∈ {0, 1}, then
U |a〉 |ε〉 =λa0 |0〉 |a0〉 + λa1 |1〉 |a1〉
=
λ00 |0〉 |00〉 , if a = 0;λ11 |1〉 |11〉 , if a = 1,
=λaa |a〉 |aa〉 , (14)
hence we arrive at
U0 ⊗ U1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Un |0a1a2 · · · an〉 |ε〉0 |ε〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ε〉n
= U0 |0〉 |ε〉0 ⊗ U1 |a1〉 |ε〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Un |an〉 |ε〉n
= λ00 |0〉 |〉00 ⊗ λa1a1 |a1〉
∣∣∣a1a1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ λanan |an〉 ∣∣∣anan〉
= λ00λa1a1 · · · · · λanan |0a1a2 · · · an〉 |00〉
∣∣∣a1a1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ∣∣∣anan〉 , (15)
where Ui(i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} denotes the unitary operator acting on the particle |ai〉, and |ε〉i denotes the ancillary
particle entangled on |ai〉. Similarly, we arrive at
U0 ⊗ U1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Un |1a¯1a¯2 · · · a¯n〉 |ε〉0 |ε〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ε〉n
= U0 |1〉 |ε〉0 ⊗ U1 |a¯1〉 |ε〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Un |a¯n〉 |ε〉n
= λ00 |1〉 |〉00 ⊗ λa¯1a¯1 |a¯1〉
∣∣∣a¯1a¯1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ λa¯na¯n |a¯n〉 ∣∣∣a¯na¯n〉
= λ00λa1a1 · · · · · λanan |1a¯1a¯2 · · · a¯n〉 |00〉
∣∣∣a1a1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ∣∣∣anan〉 , (16)
note here that we use λaiai |00〉 = λa¯ia¯i
∣∣∣a¯ia¯i〉 (see Eq. 13) in above equation. From Eqs. 15 and 16, we arrive at
U0 ⊗ U1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Un
∣∣∣G(a0i , a1i , . . . , ani )〉 |ε〉0 |ε〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ε〉n
= U0 ⊗ U1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Un 1√
2
( |0a1a2 · · · an〉 + |1a¯1a¯2 · · · a¯n〉 ) |ε〉0 |ε〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ε〉n
6
=
1√
2
(
U0 ⊗ U1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Un |0aiai · · · ai〉 |ε〉0 |ε〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ε〉n
+ U0 ⊗ U1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Un |1a¯1a¯2 · · · a¯n〉 |ε〉0 |ε〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ε〉n
)
=
1√
2
(
λ00λa1a1 · · · · · λanan |0a1a2 · · · an〉 |00〉
∣∣∣a1a1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ∣∣∣anan〉
+ λ00λa1a1 · · · · · λanan |1a¯1a¯2 · · · a¯n〉 |00〉
∣∣∣a1a1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ∣∣∣anan〉 )
= λ00λa1a1 · · · · · λanan
∣∣∣G(a0i , a1i , . . . , ani )〉 |00〉 ∣∣∣a1a1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ∣∣∣anan〉 (17)
From the equation, no error will be introduced iff the ancillary particles and the intercepted particles are in product
states. Therefore, the entanglement-measurement attack is invalid to our protocol.
The above conclusion can also be obtained by mathematical induction. From Eqs. 15, 16 and 17, it is only
necessary to prove that Eq. 15 holds. The proof is given by the following three steps:
1. When the quantum state is the single particle state |ai〉, we have U |ai〉 |ε〉 = λaiai |ai〉
∣∣∣aiai〉 (see Eq. 14).
2. Suppose that when the GHZ state is |0a1a2 · · · an−1〉, the following equation holds,
U0 ⊗ U1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Un−1 |0a1a2 · · · an−1〉 |ε〉0 |ε〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ε〉n−1
= λ00λa1a1 · · · · · λan−1an−1 |0a1a2 · · · an−1〉 |00〉
∣∣∣a1a1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ∣∣∣an−1an−1〉 , (18)
3. Then, when the state is |0a1a2 · · · an〉, we have
U0 ⊗ U1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Un |0a1a2 · · · an〉 |ε〉0 |ε〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ε〉n
= U0 ⊗ U1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Un−1 |0a1a2 · · · an−1〉 |ε〉0 |ε〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ε〉n−1 ⊗ Un |an〉 |ε〉n
= λ00λa1a1 · · · · · λan−1an−1 |0a1a2 · · · an−1〉 |00〉
∣∣∣a1a1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ∣∣∣an−1an−1〉 ⊗ λanan |an〉 ∣∣∣anan〉
= λ00λa1a1 · · · · · λanan |0a1a2 · · · an〉 |00〉
∣∣∣a1a1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ∣∣∣anan〉 , (19)
3.2 Internal attacks
Compared with external attackers, if the executors of a protocol are dishonest, they will pose a greater threat to
the security of the protocol [18]. In what follows we will analyze the internal attacks in detail from the following
two aspects: one is that a dishonest participant tries to steal the secret data from another, the other is that TP
attempts to steal the data from one or both participants.
3.2.1 Attacks from TP
Without loss of generality, we assume that TP manages to steal Alice’s secret data. Throughout our protocol,
Alice’s data Gia is essentially encrypted by K
i
AB and K
i
AC , in which the value of K
i
AB is unknown to TP, thus TP
can guess Gia with the successful probability of 1/2. In this case, TP can guess Alice’s data X with the successful
probability of 1/2dN/ne (see the second prerequisite of our protocol), where 1/2dN/ne decreases with the increase in
dN/ne. Therefore, the probability that TP guesses Alice’s secret data can be made as small as 1/2dN/2e and as large
as 1/2 by varying the value of n. Note that N is usually a large number (see the first prerequisite of our protocol),
and the larger the value of N, the longer the bit length of its binary representation. Even if the value of N is small,
Alice and Bob can increase it in many confidential ways. For example, they can agree in advance on a secret
positive integer M (or generate it as an additional key in the first step of the protocol), whose value is confidential,
and then they can calculate N × M, or NM . In this way, just make sure that dN/ne is big enough so as to make
1/2dN/ne small enough. Of course, actual situations should be taken into account in the way to increase the value of
N. After all, the larger the value of N, the more quantum resources the protocol consumes.
3.2.2 Attacks from one dishonest participant
Let us assume that Alice is dishonest and tries to steal Bob’s data because of the same role that two partici-
pants play. Throughout our protocol, there are no qubits exchanged between Alice and Bob. Therefore, only by
intercepting the particles that Bob sends to TP and measuring these particles after Bob tells TP the positions and
bases of the decoy photons can Alice have the chance to steal Bob’s data. In Step 2, Bob decides whether to flip
the value of Gib according to the value of K
i
AB ⊕ KiBC; the value of KiBC is unknown to Alice. In this case, Alice
can guess the value of Gib with the probability of 1/2. Similar to the analysis above, it is easy to see that Alice’s
probability of guessing Bob’s data Y is also 1/2dN/ne. Additionally, Alice’s attack will of course be detected as an
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external attacker during eavesdropping checking even if she intercepts Bob’s particles and replaces them with false
particles, because at this time she has no idea of the positions and bases of the decoy photons. Therefore, Alice’s
attacks will not succeed.
3.2.3 Existing attack means against QPC
We now consider whether the attacks against the existing QPC protocols pose a threat to our protocol. Let
us start with a brief review of these attacks. At present, the existing attack means focus on internal attacks, and
each one is aimed at a specific protocol. There is no universal attack means, which is, after all, difficult to propose
because different protocols adopt different technologies, or algorithms, or both. According to the difference of
attackers, the existing attack means can be divided into two categories: one is the attack means of dishonest TP,
the other is the attack means of dishonest participants (i.e., Alice and Bob). The main means of TP is to steal the
participants’ secret data by fabricating the quantum states which are used as the information carriers in the protocol,
including the ones presented in Refs. [19–23]. The main means of the participants is that one participant steals the
secret data of another by intercepting the particles transmitted between him and TP, including the ones presented in
Refs. [24–26]. Indeed, these attacks make many protocols insecure, that is, the protocols have information leakage
problem. Fortunately, these attacks are invalid for our protocol. In fact, each attack means is only used to attack
a specific protocol, but not used to attack other protocols, which is fundamentally due to the different quantum
technologies and algorithms adopted by different protocols.
Next, let us show in detail that the attack means mentioned above are invalid for our protocol. Let us first
analyze the attack means against the single-particle-based QPC protocols, including the attack means proposed
in Refs. [27, 28]. The success of the attack means in Ref. [27] is attributed to the fact that the protocol under
attack does not use decoy photon technology for eavesdropping checking, while the attack means in Ref. [28] can
attack successfully due to the two non-orthogonal bases as information carriers can be measured by a special basis.
These two attacks can not be used to attack our protocol, because our protocol uses decoy photon technology
for eavesdropping checking and uses entangled states as information carriers instead of single particles. Let us
then analyze the attack means against the entanglement-based QPC protocols, including the attack means against
the protocols using entanglement swapping [29, 30], the one against the protocols using unitary operations [20],
the ones against the protocol using one-way hash functions [31, 32], and the ones against the protocols using
entanglement correlation but not using the above three technologies [19, 21, 22, 25]. In the attack means of
[29, 30], TP either infers the participants’ data directly through the initial entangled states and the entangled states
after entanglement swapping, or steals the participants’ data by preparing fake entangled states before entanglement
swapping. Obviously, these attacks are invalid for our protocol, because our protocol does not use entanglement
swapping technology, and the quantum states used are prepared by participants rather than by TP. The attack means
in Refs. [20, 31, 32] cannot attack our protocol since the encryption method adopted in the protocols they attack
is different from that of our protocol. Other attack means can be divided into two types: one is that TP attacks by
preparing fake quantum states, which is obviously invalid for our protocol; the other is that the participants attack
by the intercept-resend attack, which is also invalid (see Sec. 3.1.1).
4 Discussion
In this section, we will first calculate qubit efficiency, and then make a comparison between our protocol and
some existing ones.
Qubit efficiency is defined as ηe = c/t, where c denotes the number of compared classical bits, and t the
number of consumed particles, excluding the decoy photons and those consumed in the process of generating the
keys using QKD [6]. In our protocol, two (n+ 1)-qubit GHZ states (n ∈ N+ and 2 ≤ n ≤ N) are used to achieve the
comparison of n bits of classical information (i.e., the comparison of Gia and G
i
b requires two (n + 1)-qubit GHZ
states). Therefore, the qubit efficiency of our protocol is n2n+2 . Obviously,
n
2n+2 increases with the increase in n,
hence we have
1
3
≤ n
2n + 2
≤ N
2N + 2
<
1
2
, (20)
and
lim
N→+∞
N
2N + 2
=
1
2
, (21)
which means N2N+2 will get closer and closer to 1/2 with the increase in N.
We have shown that by adjusting the value of n, we can determine the probability that TP can guess the partici-
pants’ secret data (1/2dN/ne), the probability that a malicious participant can guess another’s data, and determine the
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qubit efficiency (n/(2n + 2)). Of course, the value of n also determines how many qubits that a (n + 1)-qubit GHZ
state contains, thus determines the difficulty of preparing the state. Generally, the more qubits a quantum state
contains, the more difficult it is to prepare and manipulate the quantum state, with many challenges still remain
in the preparation and manipulation of multi-particle entanglement [33–36]. Fortunately, a series of significant
progress has been made in the preparation and manipulation of multi-particle GHZ states in recent years. Recent
research results show that 18-qubit entangled GHZ states have been successfully prepared experimentally [36].
In Table 2, we make the comparison between our protocol and the existing ones proposed in Refs. [16, 17, 37–
47]. In our protocol, the GHZ states are prepared by participants rather than by TP, which to some extent, improves
the security and efficiency of the protocol. Indeed, in order to achieve the purpose of private comparison, the
participants will not prepare fake quantum states. Nevertheless, in most existing QPC protocols, the quantum
states acting as information carriers are prepared by TP, in which case the protocols face more security risks
(see 3.2.3). After all, the more work TP undertakes in the protocol, the more chance he has to counterfeit. In
addition, it is known that preparing and measuring devices for quantum states are necessary in QPC, in which the
prepared quantum states act as information carriers and the measurements are usually used to extract information
contained in the quantum states. In our protocol, except for the necessary devices for preparing quantum states,
only single-particle measurement technology is used without any additional technology. Therefore, our protocol
has advantages over many existing protocols from security and device consumption.
Table 2: Comparison between our protocol and some existing ones
Reference [16] [17] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] Our protocol
QKD
√ √ × √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Unitary operation × × √ × √ √ × √ × √ √ × × ×
Entanglement swapping × × × √ × × √ × √ × × × √ ×
Entanglement measurement
√ √ × √ × × √ √ √ × × √ √ ×
Qubit efficiency 13
2
5
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
4
1
4
1
2
1
2
1
3
2
5
1
2
1
3 ≤ η < 12
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a novel QPC protocol, in which the entanglement correlation of the (n+ 1)-qubit GHZ state
and bit-flipping play key roles in the comparison of participants’ secret data. We have shown that TP and Eve
cannot steal any useful information about the participants’ data, and that Alice and Bob cannot successfully steal
each other’s data. Our protocol uses single-particle measurement technology to extract information contained in
quantum states, which is easier to implement than entanglement measurements under existing technical conditions.
The GHZ states are prepared by participants rather than by TP, which makes it unnecessary for our protocol to
verify their authenticity. The participants can choose an appropriate value for n according to actual situations. That
is, they can determine the value of n based on how many qubits of the GHZ state can be prepared by their own
devices. Indeed, the larger the value of n, the higher the qubit efficiency, but this also means the increase of the
probability that TP can guess the participants’ data although the probability is very small. Regardless of this, our
protocol has some flexibility because of the selectivity that the participants have in the preparation of the GHZ
states.
We wish that the algorithm adopted in our protocol and the security analysis, especially the security proof
against the entanglement-measurement attack, can play an enlightening role in the design and security analysis of
the GHZ-based QSMC protocols including QPC.
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